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THE FUTURE OF LIBEL LAW AND INDEPENDENT
APPELLATE REVIEW: MAKING SENSE OF BOSE
CORP. v. CONSUMERS UNION OF UNITED
STA TES, INC.
INTRODUCTION
The landmark 1964 Supreme Court decision New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan' granted publishers2'significant constitutional protection
from libel suits by requiring that public officials prove actual malice
as a prerequisite to recovering damages. This doctrine was subse-
quently extended to apply to public figures. Federal courts of ap-
peals have enforced the Sullivan protections through the practice of
independent appellate review, a doctrine that requires appellate re-
view of the trial court proceedings to determine whether the facts
found by the court satisfy the requirement of actual malice.3
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,4 the
Supreme Court strongly reaffirmed the Sullivan actual malice re-
quirement 5 and explicitly affirmed the widespread use of independ-
ent appellate review by federal appeals courts reviewing district
court libel judgments. 6 Unfortunately, the Bose Court failed to con-
struct a coherent and workable doctrine of independent appellate
review that could apply outside the area of libel. By adopting an ad
hoc labeling approach to control the application of independent ap-
pellate review, the Court confuses the distinction between questions
of fact, which are subject to restricted review under the "clearly er-
roneous" test of rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7
and mixed questions of law and fact, which appellate courts may
1 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 This Note uses the term "publisher" to signify all print and broadcast media and
private entities that could, through their public utterances or writings, be subject to a
libel suit under Sullivan.
3 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1958
(1984) ("[A]n appellate court has an obligation to 'make an independent examination of
the whole record' in order to make sure 'that the judgment does not constitute a forbid-
den intrusion on the field of free expression.' ") (citations omitted).
4 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
5 See id. at 1965-66; see also Abrams, The Supreme Court Turns a New Page in Libel,
A.B.A.J., Aug. 1984, at 91, 92.
6 See infra note 37, and notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
7 Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads in relevant part: "Find-
ings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R.
Civ. P. 52(a).
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freely review.8 Because the labeling process dictates the applicable
level of appellate review,9 this confusion will result in inconsistent
application of independent appellate review outside the libel con-
text. Additionally, the Court's flawed rationale may undermine
what would be the clear mandate of Sullivan and Bose-that appellate
courts must vigorously review libel judgments to certify compliance
with the constitutional requirement of actual malice.
This Note argues that principled methods exist to distinguish
between mixed questions of law and fact worthy of independent ap-
pellate review and those unworthy of the additional expenditure of
resources. These methods allow appellate courts the necessary
power to protect vulnerable legal rights while preserving the spirit
of rule 52(a).
Section I of this Note explains the Sullivan actual malice stan-
dard and discusses the pre-Bose utilization of independent appellate
review by federal courts of appeals reviewing district court libel de-
cisions. Section II presents the facts and holding of the Bose case.
In Section III this Note critiques the Bose analysis and suggests how
the Court could have reached the same result more clearly without
injecting uncertainty into this critical area of the law. Section IV
concludes that independent appellate review of actual malice deter-
minations under Sullivan remains, at least for the foreseeable future,




A. Sullivan and the Actual Malice Standard
The Supreme Court's 1964 decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan'0 marks the beginning of modem libel law."' Sullivan recog-
nized a constitutional limit on the power of the states to hold pub-
8 For a definition of "mixed questions," see infra text accompanying note 88.
Mixed questions and pure questions of law are not subject to rule 52(a). "[T]here is
substantial authority that [mixed questions of law and fact] are not protected by the
'clearly erroneous' rule and are freely reviewable." 9 C. WRIGIrT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2589, at 753 (1971). See also Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1960 ("Rule
52(a) does not inhibit an appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including
those that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and fact, or a finding of fact that is
predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law.") (citation omitted).
9 Because findings of fact are normally given deferential review on appeal, while
determinations of law are freely reviewable, blurring the distinction results in treating
similar matters differently in an almost random fashion.
10 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For contemporaneous treatments of the Sullivan case, see
generally Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central Meaning of the First Amend-
ment, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191; Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern
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lishers liable for falsely defaming public officials. 12 The Court
subsequently expanded this category of lesser-protected entities to
include "public figures."' 3 In general, individuals or corporations
who have thrust themselves to the forefront of a particular matter
are public figures for the purpose of commentary on that matter.' 4
The Sullivan Court sought to minimize chilling public debate' 5
by providing publishers with "breathing space,"' 6 hoping to avoid
editorial "self-censorship."' 7 By eliminating liability for the good
faith publication of defamatory falsehoods, the Court intended to
promote the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate of public
issues,' 8 without eviscerating the public figure's common law right
to protect his reputation.' 9 The Sullivan decision and its progeny
Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581 (1964); Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic Deci-
sion: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REv. 315 (1965).
11 Abrams, supra note 5, at 90 ("Sullivan ... change[d] much that had been long
embedded in law."). Prior to Sullivan, the common law of defamation was based on the
general principle that a publisher published an unintentionally defamatory statement at
his own peril. In addition, the defendant in a civil suit bore the burden of proving the
truth of a published statement. A complex structure of privileges, which attempted to
protect the free flow of information, mitigated this harsh scheme somewhat. See PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS 804 (5th ed. 1984).
12 376 U.S. at 270-83. The plaintiff in Sullivan was an elected city commissioner of
Montgomery, Alabama.
13 The Court first extended the Sullivan rule to public figures in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). An expansive but short-lived reading of the
public figure category emerged in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43
(1971), in which the Court held in a plurality opinion by Justice Brennan that involve-
ment in an event of public interest could give rise to public figure status. The Court
rejected this broad interpretation in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-46
(1974), in which it noted three classes of potential public figures: (1) those deemed pub-
lic figures for all purposes, (2) those who thrust themselves to the forefront of a particu-
lar controversy and hence become public figures in relation to that issue, and (3) those
who become public figures through no purposeful action of their own. The Court fur-
ther narrowed the public figure category in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S.
157, 167 (1979), in which it held that a criminal defendant does not automatically be-
come a public figure for purposes of comment on issues relating to his conviction.
Courts must instead focus on the nature and extent of the individual's participation in
the controversy.
14 Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979).
15 376 U.S. at 279. For a general treatment of the "chilling effect" and its role in
constitutional law, see Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv.
808 (1969). The term was first used in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[A loyalty oath] has an unmistakable tendency to chill that
free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice
16 376 U.S. at 272.
17 Id. at 279.
18 Id. at 270.
19 Sullivan did not grant publishers an absolute privilege in reporting about public
officials. Justice Black, well-known for his strong first amendment views, stated in Sulli-
van: "An unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I con-
sider to be the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment. I regret that the Court has
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outlined three elements to effectuate this goal: (1) a defamed public
figure must prove that the publisher acted with actual malice;20 (2)
actual malice must be demonstrated with clear and convincing
proof;2 1 and (3) independent appellate review of the entire trial rec-
ord is required to insure that the body of evidence meets the consti-
tutional standard of actual malice. 22 A discussion of each of these
requirements follows.
1. Actual Malice
To recover a libel judgment for a false and defamatory state-
ment, a public figure plaintiff must prove that the publisher made
the statement with actual malice, i.e., "with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."'23
Both formulations, actual knowledge and reckless disregard, are
subjective standards. 24 Penalizing only subjectively culpable pub-
lishers protects innocent mistakes and avoids chilling public debate
of important issues.25
Use of a subjective standard, however, creates significant
problems of proof. A court cannot infer actual knowledge of falsity
from what a reasonable person in the defendant's position would
stopped short of this holding .... Id. at 297 (Black, J., concurring) (footnote omit-
ted).
In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133-34 (1979), the Court noted that
"[s]ince. .. Sullivan. . . this Court has sought to define the accommodation required
to assure the vigorous debate on the public issues that the First Amendment was
designed to protect while at the same time affording protection to the reputations of
individuals." (citations and footnote omitted). In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 152 (1967), Justice Harlan stated that "the basic theory of libel has not
changed, and words defamatory of another are still placed 'in the same class with the use
of explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals' [as actionable torts]." (Harlan, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 108, at 792
(3d ed. 1964)). See also infra note 124 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
23 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
24 Actual knowledge is a subjective standard because it refers only to the state of
mind of the defendant. The Supreme Court has defined reckless disregard as a subjec-
tive standard. "[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man
would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968) (emphasis added). See also Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1569
(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The test is not an objective one. ), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2672
(1985).
25 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1966
(1984) (" 'Realistically, . . . some error is inevitable; and the difficulties of separating
fact from fiction convinced the Court in [Sullivan]; Butts, Gertz, and similar cases to limit
liability to instances where some degree of culpability is present......) (quoting Her-
bert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1979)).
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have known.26 Consequently, proof of actual knowledge usually re-
quires outright admissions of guilt from defendants. 27 Reckless dis-
regard is only slightly easier to prove. The plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant had such significant indicia of the
statement's possible falsity that he was reckless in disregarding
them.28
2. Clear and Convincing Proof
The second prong of the Sullivan test requires clear and con-
vincing proof of actual malice. 29 Clear and convincing proof consti-
tutes a higher standard of proof than the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard30 employed in most civil litigation but falls short
of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of the criminal law.31
This heightened proof requirement shifts the benefit of the doubt
toward the defendant and prevents erroneous intrusions upon "the
field of free expression." 3 2
3. Independent Appellate Review
The Court in Sullivan exercised independent appellate review of
the entire trial record to determine whether the evidence met the
26 See id. (rejecting premise that actual knowledge of falsity can be inferred because
author of statement was intelligent and thus must have known that statement was false).
To hold otherwise would undermine Sullivan's rationale of preventing unnecessary chil-
ling of speech.
27 See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 170 ("It may be that plaintiffs will rarely be successful in
proving awareness of falsehood from the mouth of the defendant himself•...").
28 Accordingly, the courts have not found recklessness when the plaintiff cannot
show that the defendant had information suggesting that the statement in question was
false. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966) (no
evidence that defendant "had clear grounds to suspect that the statements might be
false."); Drotzmanns v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 500 F.2d 830, 834 (8th Cir. 1974) (no person
"entertained any suspicion that plaintiff would be libeled by the article").
29 376 U.S. at 285-86 ("[W]e consider that the proof presented to show actual mal-
ice lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands ....").
"Convincing clarity" and "clear and convincing proof" are synonymous terms. See, e.g.,
Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1965 ("The question whether the evidence in the record. ..is of the
convincing clarity required. . . is not mnerely a question for the trier of fact. . . . Judges
• ..must independently decide whether the evidence .., is not supported by clear and
convincing proof of 'actual malice.' ") (emphasis added).
30 See, e.g., E. DEvTrr & C. BLAciMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 71.14 (3d ed. 1977) (preponderance of the evidence means "to prove that something
is more likely so than not so").
31 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 195 (1st
Cir. 1982); Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932, 940
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980). See also Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 104 n.28 (1984) (quantifying levels of confidence in different
proof standards as "beyond a reasonable doubt = 95% ... ; clear and convincing evi-
dence = 75% ... ; and preponderance of the evidence = 51%").
32 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
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constitutional standard of actual malice.3 3 This independent review
required the Court to determine whether the evidence presented to
the state court jury3 4 satisfied the federal constitutional standard of
actual malice. 35 The Court exercised independent appellate review
in Sullivan under the expansive reach of its federal question jurisdic-
tion.36 The Court did not discuss whether independent appellate
review could be conducted by other courts or in other contexts. 37
B. Independent Appellate Review of Federal District Court
Libel Decisions
Until Bose the Supreme Court had never explicitly extended the
application of independent appellate review to cases decided by
either judges or juries in the federal district courts. 38 Nevertheless,
33 Id. at 285.
34 Id. at 256. The jury in the Circuit Court of Montgomery, Alabama, awarded
plaintiff Sullivan $500,000. Id.
35 The more protective federal constitutional rule enunciated in Sullivan overrides
the applicable Alabama libel law. "We hold today that the Constitution delimits a
State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against
critics. . . . Alabama law. . . is inconsistent with the federal rule." Id at 283-84.
36 Professors Wright and Miller perceive no obstacle to Supreme Court review of
state trial court findings.
[T]here is no injury to fundamental precepts of federalism in holding
state courts to whatever standards of factfinding are within the institu-
tional capacities of the Supreme Court as an appellate tribunal. Indeed,
it could be argued that more searching review is justified (in reviewing
cases from state courts), since state procedure may not be as good as
federal procedure, and state courts may not be as concerned as federal
courts with protecting federal rights. . . . [I]t is clear that in practice the
Court has been willing at least to provide searching review of state find-
ings in a variety of circumstances.
16 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4033, at 780-81
(1977).
37 Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971), arguably provides implicit support for
the use of independent appellate review in the context of reviewing a federal court ac-
tual malice determination. The Supreme Court noted that it frequently "had occasion
to review 'the evidence in the. . . record to determine whether it could constitutionally
support a judgment,'" but did not address the extension of independent appellate re-
view to appeals from federal trial court decisions. Id. at 284 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S.
at 284-85) (citations omitted). The district court had granted Time's motion for a di-
rected verdict. Id. at 283. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the question
whether evidence against Time sustained a finding of actual malice was a question for
the jury. Id. Exercising independent appellate review, the Supreme Court concluded
that the evidence adduced could not, standing alone, sustain a finding of actual malice.
Id. at 289. The majority did not discuss the legal basis for its or the courts of appeals'
use of independent appellate review in the federal case context.
38 The majority of the libel cases reaching the Supreme Court originated in state
courts and did not provide an opportunity to extend independent appellate review to
federal trial court libel judgments. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77-79
(1964) (Louisiana Supreme Court decision reversed because state court failed to apply
Sullivan actual malice formulation); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87-88 (1966) (New
Hampshire decision reversed because Sullivan was decided after case went to trial);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 394 (1967) (New York Court of Appeals decision re-
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numerous circuit courts have engaged in independent appellate re-
view in the two decades following Sullivan.3 9 Until Bose no public
figure plaintiff had challenged the practice. As a result, no court had
directly confronted the apparent conflict between the independent
appellate review doctrine and rule 52(a)40 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. In appeals from federal nonjury trials rule 52(a)
prohibits review of the trial judge's findings of fact unless they are
"dearly erroneous." 4 1 Bose is the first case to analyze whether in-
dependent appellate review conflicts with rule 52(a) by subjecting a
trial judge's finding of actual malice to additional review.
The circuit courts' application of independent appellate review
has favored publishers. Using independent appellate review, the
courts of appeals have reversed approximately seventy percent of
the libel judgments entered against publishers. 42 Had appellate
courts not been able to implement a true actual malice standard, the
national media surely would be less vigorous and competitive in
bringing information to the public. This high reversal rate demon-
strates the tendency of trial judges and juries to disregard the con-
stitutional privilege accorded the press in order to reach more
intuitively "fair" verdicts. 43 Were federal courts of appeals limited
solely to clearly erroneous review under rule 52(a), the resulting de-
versed because jury was not instructed on Sullivan rule); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v.
Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967) (per curiam) (Defendant who lost right to object to West
Virginia Circuit Court's failure to instruct jury under Sullivan standard nonetheless
properly objected to sufficiency of evidence; Supreme Court exercised independent ap-
pellate review, reversed jury verdict); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31
(1968) (Louisiana Supreme Court reversed on grounds that evidence did not meet reck-
less disregard standard because of misinterpretation of Sullivan standard); Greenbelt
Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) (Maryland Court of Appeals
utilized independent appellate review to reverse and remand for failure to meet actual
malice requirement). But see supra note 37.
39 Circuit courts of appeals have utilized independent appellate review in more
than 60 libel cases. Brief for Amicus Curiae New York Times Co. et al., at 16-17, Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984). The following
constitute a representative sample: Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982); Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 619 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v.
Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666
(4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1024 (1983); Gaines v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 681
F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1982); Schultz v. Newsweek, Inc., 668 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1982);
Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 500 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1974); Alioto v. Cowles
Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
40 See supra note 7.
41 "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
42 Brief for Amicus Curiae New York Times Co. et al., at 17, Bose, 104 S. Ct. 1949.
43 See Brill, Redoing Libel Law, The American Lawyer, Sept. 1984, at 110 (quoting
Floyd Abrams, Esq.) ("The Bill of Rights is counter-intuitive. But jurors are intuitive.
1986] 483
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crease in reversals of incorrect libel judgments would chill the spir-
ited public debate that Sullivan was formulated to protect.44 The
resolution of the apparent conflict between rule 52(a) and the prac-
tice of independent appellate review thus determines the future of
Sullivan's protections for the press.
II
THE CASE-BosE CORP. V. CONSUMERS UNION OF UNITED
STATES, INC.
In 1970 Consumer Reports magazine published an unfavorable
product review of the Bose 901 stereo loudspeaker system. When
Consumers Union refused to publish a retraction,45 Bose Corpora-
tion instituted a product disparagement 46 action in the federal dis-
trict court for the District of Massachusetts. 47 The Court, as trier of
fact, found that the statement in the article that "individual instru-
ments heard through the Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic
proportions and tended to wander about the room"48 was both false
and disparaging.49 Because Bose Corporation was a public figure,50
And they intuitively think they're there in a libel case to decide if a publication or net-
work has been fair to a plaintiff.").
44 If the clearly erroneous standard is something more than a manipulable label,
some appellate courts would be required to refrain from overruling trial judges when
the trial judge's decision had a reasonable basis even though the appellate court might
find the evidence constitutionally insufficient in its own opinion.
45 Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1953.
46 Product disparagement, the tort of "injurious falsehood,"
may consist of the publication of matter derogatory to the plaintiff's tide
to his property, or its quality, or to his business in general .... The
plaintiff must prove special damages in the form of pecuniary loss, and
this necessarily requires that the falsehood be communicated to a third
person.. . . The communication must play a material and substantial
part in inducing others not to deal with the plaintiff, with the result that
special damage, in the form of the loss of trade or other dealings, is
established.
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at 967 (footnotes omitted).
Product disparagement is a tort distinct from but essentially similar to libel, at least
when the plaintiff corporation is considered a "public figure." Id. at 962, 970. See also
infra note 50 and accompanying text.
47 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1277
(D. Mass. 1981).
48 Id. at 1253.
49 Id. at 1267-68.
50 Id. at 1271-74. The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a corporation can
qualify as a public figure under Gertz for purposes of a corporate defamation or product
disparagement suit. See supra note 13. The Court did not reach the issue in Bose, noting
only that the court of appeals was uncertain whether to apply the Sullivan rule to a claim
of product disparagement arising from a critical review of a loudspeaker system. 104 S.
Ct. at 1966. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's reservations, the First Circuit actually
expressed little doubt in its discussion of the issue.
Bose acknowledged that it does not dispute. . . that the corporation is a
public figure with respect to the subject matter of the CU article. Bose
484 [Vol. 71:477
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a designation that Bose Corporation did not contest upon appeal,5 '
the district court required Bose to satisfy the higher actual malice
standard.52
The district court decided that because the author of the article,
Arnold Seligson, was an "intelligent person," 53 his testimony con-
cerning what he actually meant in the article was not credible.54
From this conclusion the Court drew the opposite inference from
Seligson's testimony, that he knew that his criticism of the speakers'
performance was inaccurate. 55 The district court found this knowl-
edge to be clear and convincing proof that Seligson had harbored
also conceded that ... Sullivan applies in this case .... [T]he district
court analyzed both of these issues at length and we accept its conclu-
sions for the purposes of this case.
692 F.2d at 194. The majority of lower courts and commentators have concluded that
corporations can be classified as public figures; the current debate centers on whether
corporations are always public figures or whether they are simply public figures for lim-
ited purposes as a result of their own voluntary conduct.
In Bose the district court adopted the reasoning of Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980), and Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623
F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980), in holding Bose Corporation to be a public figure for the pur-
pose of product reviews of the Bose 901 loudspeaker system. 508 F. Supp. at 1272-73.
The Bruno & Stillman court adopted a two-part test to determine corporate public figure
status, inquiring into (1) the existence of a public controversy at the time of the state-
ment and (2) the nature and extent of the plaintiff's participation in the controversy
giving rise to the defamation. Bruno & Stillman, 633 F.2d at 591.
The district court found that Bose was a public figure for the purpose of the product
review because it created a public controversy by designing a new speaker, extensively
promoting it, and soliciting product reviews. 508 F. Supp. at 1273. This finding satis-
fied both prongs of the Bruno & Stillman test. The court also noted that Bose had access
to the media and could have rebutted unfavorable reviews and that Bose had voluntarily
assumed the risk of defamatory and false statements. Id. at 1274. Thus, the court ap-
plied Sullivan's heightened standard of proof to Bose Corporation.
The district court, while noting that the previous cases involving corporations were
corporate defamation actions, held that the same factors that support application of Sul-
livan to corporate defamation support its application to product disparagement actions.
Id. at 1270-71.
A significant body of commentary has developed concerning the proper public fig-
ure test to apply to corporations under Sullivan and Gertz. See, e.g., Fetzer, The Corporate
Defamation Plaintjff as First Amendment "Public Figure'" Nailing the Jellyfish, 68 IowA L. REv.
35 (1982); Note, Defamation and the First Amendment in the Corporate Context, 46 Ai. L. REv.
603 (1982); Note, Corporate Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to
Personal Defamation, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 963 (1975); Comment, The First Amendment and the
Basis of Liability in Actions for Corporate Libel and Product Disparagement, 27 EMORY L.J. 755
(1978); Note, Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.: Extending the
New York Times Privilege to Product Disparagement, 44 U. Prrr. L. RE V. 1039 (1983).
51 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 194 (Ist
Cir. 1982).
52 Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 1271.
53 Id. at 1276.
54 Id. at 1277.
55 Id. See infra note 67 (concerning propriety of drawing opposite conclusion from
disbelieved testimony).
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the requisite actual malice,5 6 and entered judgment against Con-
sumers Union. Damages were assessed at a separate trial.57
The First Circuit reversed the district court.58 The circuit court
accepted, for purposes of the appeal, several of the district court's
findings: that Bose Corporation was a public figure, that the state-
ment in question was false, and that it was disparaging.5 9 The First
Circuit, however, reversed the judgment because it was unable to
find clear and convincing proof that Consumers Union published
the false and disparaging statement with "knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 60 The
court reached this conclusion by exercising what it termed an "in-
dependent. . . examin[ation of] the record to ensure that the dis-
trict court [had] applied properly the governing constitutional law
and that the plaintiff [had] indeed satisfied its burden of proof."61
The First Circuit addressed only whether the evidence before the
court satisfied the constitutional actual malice standard; it overruled
none of the trial court's factual findings. 62 ,
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, sustained
the reversal of the judgment against Consumers Union.63 The Court
thereby revitalized the Sullivan rule64 by explicitly approving the ex-
tension of independent appellate review to federal trial court judg-
ments. 65 After conducting its own independent appellate review of
the trial court finding of actual malice, the Supreme Court agreed
with the First Circuit's determination that "the record does not con-
tain clear and convincing evidence that Seligson . . . [acted] with
knowledge that [the article] contained a false statement, or with
reckless disregard of the truth." 66 The Supreme Court noted that
the facts of this case might have justified a reversal of the actual
malice finding on the ground that it was "clearly erroneous," 67 but
56 Id.
57 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 357 (D.
Mass. 1981).
58 Bose, 692 F.2d 189 (Ist Cir. 1982).
59 Id. at 194.
60 Id. at 197.
61 Id. at 195.
62 Although the First Circuit termed its review "de novo," id. at 195, the Supreme
Court was careful to identify this as a misnomer because "the Court of Appeals did not
overturn any factual finding to which Rule 52(a) would be applicable, but instead en-
gaged in an independent assessment only of the evidence germane to the actual malice
determination." Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1967 n.31. But see id. at 1968 (Rehnquist,J., dissent-
ing) (arguing appellate court engaged in de novo review). De novo review would entail
appellate redetermination of the factual issues.
63 Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1967.
64 Id. at 1963-65. See also Abrams, supra note 5, at 89, 91.
65 See supra note 37, and notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
66 104 S. Ct. at 1967.
67 "It may well be that in this case, the 'finding' of the District Court on the actual
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the Court chose instead to affirm the practice of independent appel-
late review.68 ChiefJustice Burger concurred in the judgment with-
out separate opinion.69
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented, 70
contending that the finding of actual malice was pure historical fact,
reviewable only under the "clearly erroneous" standard of rule
52(a). 71 Thus, the dissent advocated remanding the case to the First
Circuit for a redetermination under rule 52(a). 72 The dissent would
have limited the use of independent appellate review to state court
decisions, as in the Sullivan case. 73 This interpretation would pro-
hibit the use of independent appellate review by the federal courts
of appeals, a practice common since the Sullivan decision.74
Justice White, dissenting separately, 75 agreed with Justice
Rehnquist that the actual knowledge component of the Sullivan ac-
tual malice test was a question of historical fact and therefore should
be reviewed under rule 52(a), but concluded that the reckless disre-
gard component of Sullivan was not a question of historical fact.7 6
He gave no explanation for this distinction. Presumably, the dis-
tinction arises because a finding of actual malice based on reckless
disregard, unlike a finding based on actual knowledge, usually re-
malice question could have been set aside under the clearly erroneous standard of re-
view .... Id. The Court implied that the First Circuit could have reversed the trial
court simply because critical reviews are matters of protected opinion. Id. at 1955, 1967.
The Court criticized the trial court for drawing a contrary conclusion from the author's
disbelieved testimony. The Court stated that discredited testimony is not usually a suffi-
cient basis for drawing the opposite conclusion. Id. at 1966. Additionally, the Court
noted that the precision level required by the trial court could make any individual using
a malapropism liable. Id.
68 "We hold that the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure does not prescribe the standard of review to be applied in reviewing a
determination of actual malice in a case governed by New York Times v. Sullivan. Appel-
late judges in such a case must exercise independent judgment and determine whether
the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity." Id. at 1967 (footnote
omitted).
69 Thus, while one of the six members of the Court joining in the judgment, Chief
Justice Burger did not necessarily join in the majority's reaffirmation of Sullivan. The
ChiefJustice's lack of enthusiasm for Sullivan probably led him to abstain from joining
the opinion. See infra note 128 (ChiefJustice Burger's statement in Greenmoss).
70 Id. at 1967-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 1968-70.
72 Id. at 1970.
73 "[Sullivan] came to this Court from a state court after a jury trial, and thus
presented the strongest case for independent fact-finding by this Court. . . .Thus it is
not surprising to me that early cases espousing the notion of independent appellate
review of'constitutional facts'. . . should have arisen out of the context ofjury verdicts
and that they then were perhaps only reflexively applied in other quite different contexts
without further analysis." Id. at 1969 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
75 104 S. Ct. at 1967 (White, J., dissenting).
76 Id.
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quires the trier of fact to infer recklessness from circumstantial evi-
dence. Thus, Justice White would find inferences independently
reviewable under Sullivan, while he would review pure historical
facts only under rule 52(a).77 He agreed with Justice Rehnquist that
the case should be remanded to the court of appeals for redetermi-
nation using the "clearly erroneous" standard.78
III
ANALYSIS
In Pullman-Standard v. Swint7 9 the Supreme Court characterized
the question of intent to discriminate as a question of fact.80 If ap-
plied to Bose, the Swint analysis would render the actual malice de-
termination a question of fact as well.8 1 The Bose Court, however,
correctly categorized the actual malice issue as a mixed question of
law and fact.8 2 Unfortunately, the Bose Court neither overruled nor
77 Distinguishing the two components of the actualmalice test from each other be-
cause one is based on a process of inference runs against a settled rule that findings
based on inferences are equal to findings of historical fact for the purposes of rule 52(a).
See Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of Appellate Review in Disparate Treatment
Cases-Limiting the Reach of Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 58 TUL. L. REV. 403, 413 n.48
(1983).
78 104 S. Ct. at 1967 (White, J., dissenting).
79 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
80 Id. at 285-90.
81 See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
82 In discussing why independent appellate review cannot be withheld in favor of a
determination of actual malice by the trier of fact, the Court stated that "Rule 52(a) does
not inhibit an appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including those that may
infect a so-called mixed finding of law and fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a
misunderstanding of the governing rule of law." 104 S. Ct. at 1960 (citations omitted).
In discussing the distinction between law and fact the Court noted that "[w]here the line
is drawn varies according to the nature of the substantive law at issue." Id. at n.17. The
Court used policy considerations to liberate the actual malice question from the pure
fact category into which Swint would have placed it. This Note argues that the Court's
tortured analysis results from its disinclination to overrule Swint and its inability to
otherwise distinguish that case. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. Moreover,
whatever the Court's motivation, this Note contends that the Bose Court clearly believed
the actual malice question to be a mixed question of law and fact. Indeed, the Court's
own definition of mixed questions in Swint requires such a result. See infra notes 88-91
and accompanying text. Concededly, the Court desired to obscure this determination, to
avoid its glaring inconsistency with Swint.
One commentator argues that it "becomes apparent. . . that the court in Bose ap-
plied the principle of independent appellate review to a finding of pure fact." Comment,
The Expanding Scope of Appellate Review in Libel Cases-The Supreme Court Abandons the Clearly
Erroneous Standard of Review for Findings of Actual Malice, 36 MERCER L. REv. 711, 727
(1985). This argument is based on the belief that the actual malice finding is a question
of law but that the actual knowledge component is a question of fact. Id. at 728. This
Note, however, argues that neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court reviewed
de novo subsidiary facts leading to a conclusion that actual malice does or does not
exist. Rather, the appellate courts reweighed the aggregation of facts to see whether
they equalled or exceeded the constitutional requirement of actual malice. No factual
findings of the trial court were overturned. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1967. A simple review of
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successfully distinguished Swint. Bose properly applies independent
appellate review in the libel context. However, Bose proposes no
workable structure for determining when independent appellate re-
view is appropriate in other contexts. In fact, the Court's inability to
explain the different treatment accorded the similar questions in
Swint and Bose may result in a perception of independent appellate
review as a tool of judicial favoritism.8 3 The Bose Court could have
reached the same result while at the same time evolving a coherent
and defensible doctrine of independent appellate review.
A. Jurisprudence by Labels: Actual Malice in Bose and Intent
to Discriminate in Swint
Two years before Bose, in the employment discrimination case
Pullman-Standard v. Swint,s 4 the Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Circuit had erred in independently reviewing the trial court's find-
ing that an employer had intended to discriminate.8 5 The Court
stated that the Fifth Circuit should have engaged in the limited re-
view prescribed by rule 52(a) because the defendant's state of mind
is a question of fact rather than a mixed question of law and fact.86
Bose Corporation, relying primarily on the Swint decision, argued
that a determination of actual malice is, like the issue in Swint, also a
question of fact and that it should be reviewed under the "clearly
erroneous" standard of rule 52(a).8 7
The Swint Court defined mixed questions as "questions in
the facts dictated that in the aggregate the facts did not constitute culpable conduct
under the constitutional rule. Id. at 1967 n.31. The Court clearly applied independent
appellate review to a mixed question of law and fact.
Professot Bezanson would also disagree, however, arguing that "the Court was not
prepared to characterize the actual malice issue as one of mixed law and fact, or
interpretation of accepted fact in terms of the legal standard of actual malice." Bezan-
son, Fault, Falsity and Reputation in Public Defamation Law: An Essay on Bose Corporation v.
Consumers Union, 8 HAmLINE L. REv. 105, 118 (1985). This Note concedes that the
Court avoided the clear statement that the actual malice determination was a mixed
question because it wanted to avoid the ramifications of not following Swint. But this
Note attempts to show why the Court acted as it did and tries to make sense of the
opinion.
83 Some Court observers might argue that the Court's different treatment of Swint
and Bose is the result of its preference for those exercising speech rights over those
claiming discrimination injuries.
84 456 U.S. 273 (1982). Swint involved a suit under title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). Section 703(h) of the Act prohibits
different treatment of employees through seniority programs when the employer in-
tends to discriminate on the basis of race or color. The existence of this intent was the
issue in Swint. 456 U.S. at 275.
85 456 U.S. at 286.
86 Id. at 287-88 ("That question . . . is a pure question of fact, subject to Rule
52(a)'s clearly-erroneous standard. It is not a question of law and not a mixed question
of law and fact.").
87 See Brief for Petitioner at 40-49, 70-82, Bose, 104 S. Ct. 1949.
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which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law
is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory
standard, or . . .whether the rule of law as applied to the estab-
lished facts is or is not violated."88 The issues of intent presented in
Swint and Bose both qualify as mixed questions of law and fact.8 9
Each inquiry centers upon the defendant's state of mind during the
commission of a harmful act. In Swint the defendant was liable only
if he possessed an intent to discriminate; proof of discrimination
alone was insufficient. 90 Similarly, in Bose the publication of a false
and defamatory statement about a public figure was insufficient to
support liability without the culpable mental state of either actual
knowledge or reckless disregard of the statement's falsity.91
The Bose Court made little attempt to distinguish the question
of actual malice question in Bose from the intent to discriminate
question in Swint. The Court did attempt to distinguish the cases on
other grounds, however. The Bose Court noted that the actual mal-
ice determination in Bose implicated constitutional interests. 92
Swint, however, involved only statutory rights and an intent standard
supplied by the statute.93 In Bose the Court noted that the Sullivan
actual malice standard was designed to protect publishers who unin-
tentionally harm public figures by publishing false and defamatory
statements 94 and to prevent the unconstitutional chilling of speech
through self-censorship. 95 The Court adopted independent appel-
late review to ensure that aggressive review of trial court decisions
upheld the constitutional standard, thereby reducing the number of
erroneous judgments.96 Although independent appellate review
88 456 U.S. at 289 n.19.
89 Justice Rehnquist recognized the similarity of the two questions but character-
ized them both as pure questions of fact. He described the actual malice determination
as "a determination as to the actual subjective state of mind of a particular person at a
particular time." 104 S. Ct. at 1969 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This analysis ignores
the fact that Swint identified the weighing of the entire body of evidence against the legal
standard as a mixed question of law and fact. See supra text accompanying note 88.
90 See supra note 84.
91 For a discussion of the content of the "knowledge" and "recklessness" require-
ments, see supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
92 104 S. Ct. at 1959 ("[T]he rule of independent review assigns to judges a consti-
tutional responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact ...."); id. at 1961
("This process has been vitally important in cases involving restrictions on the freedom
of speech protected by the First Amendment. ..
93 See supra note 84.
94 See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
96 It is a basic assumption in the American judicial system that appellate review
generally adds to the correctness ofjudgments and is therefore limited only in the inter-
est ofjudicial economy. This view is implicit inJustice Rehnquist's statements in favor
of limiting appellate review. "'[W]e have an obsessive concern that the result reached
in a particular case be the right one. . . . [T]he time has come to abolish appeal as a
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may conflict with rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,9 7 the constitutionally mandated Sullivan procedures must pre-
vail over statutory provisions. These distinctions between the cases
are important, but they do not distinguish the nature of the question
in Swint from the nature of the question in Bose.
The Court reveals in a footnote that it defined identical ques-
tions differently in Bose and Swint to enforce its policy concerns.
Where the line is drawn [between questions of fact and mixed
questions of law and fact] varies according to the nature of the
substantive law at issue. Regarding certain largely factual ques-
tions in some areas of the law, the stakes-in terms of impact on
future cases and future conduct-are too great to entrust them
finally to the judgment of the trier of fact.98
The Court, however, did not and can not successfully explain how
the nature of a question can change, not according to its content,
but according to what the Court's policy concerns dictate.
B. A Proposal for an Effective Doctrine: Honest
Categorization of Mixed Questions and Principled
Restrictions on Application of Independent
Appellate Review99
Policy choices play a legitimate role in the allocation of addi-
matter of right....' Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 603, 605 (1985)
(citingJustice Rehnquist).
97 The Court at times argues (1) that rule 52(a) and independent appellate review
are inconsistent with each other and that the constitutional interest must prevail, and (2)
that rule 52(a) is not violated because no factual findings were overruled. This inconsis-
tency muddles the entire analysis. However, the Court's reluctance to admit that a
broad range of mixed questions are now being miscategorized as questions of fact may
explain its conttadictory stances. Under the present system, the Court requires a doc-
trine to remove some important questions from the confines of rule 52(a). Independent
appellate review serves this purpose. If mixed questions were admitted to be mixed
questions, the doctrine of independent appellate review would not be needed but for
reasons ofjudicial economy, because by definition rule 52(a) does not apply to mixed
questions. One recent commentator acknowledges this contradiction in the Court's
opinion, apparently feels that Bose makes little sense as decided, and hints that the actual
malice question may indeed be a mixed question properly removed from the realm of
rule 52(a). See Note, Can Civil Rule 52(a) Peacefully Co-Exist with Independent Review in Ac-
tual Malice Cases?-Bose Corp v. Consumers Union, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984), 60 WAsH. L.
REv. 503, 504, 521 (1985).
98 104 S. Ct. at 1960 n.17.
99 This Note would apply independent appellate review on an issue-by-issue basis,
rather than on a case-by-case basis. In Time, Inc. v Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971), Justice
Harlan dissented and argued against the unprincipled use of independent appellate
review. In his dissent, Justice Harlan perceived the ramifications of independent
appellate review, stating that
[t]he step taken today, whereby this Court undertakes to judge, "on the
specific facts of this case" . . . whether a jury could reasonably find
[actual malice] . . . is . . .not warranted. . . . [I]t is almost impossible
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tional appellate review in certain instances. 100 To establish a coher-
ent, workable doctrine of independent appellate review, courts must
honestly identify those questions that involve whether "the rule of
law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated" and de-
fine these as mixed questions of law and fact not subject to the stric-
tures of rule 52(a). This will result in removing a substantial number
of questions from the "pure fact" category where they are now
largely insulated from aggressive appellate review.
The unlimited application of independent appellate review to
all mixed questions would admittedly do more harm than good. 10'
Careful allocation of independent appellate review, however, would
allow scarce appellate resources to be targeted for the areas of the
law which require extra attention. Thus, the second prong of this
doctrine requires that a principled analysis be made which would
relegate the large majority of these newly minted mixed questions
back to de facto "clearly erroneous" review. Only extraordinary cir-
to conceive how this Court might continue to function effectively were we
to resolve afresh the underlying factual disputes in all cases containing
constitutional issues. . . . I fear that what [the Court has] done today
may open a door that will prove difficult to close.
Id. at 293-94 (Harlan, J., dissenting). He suggested that independent appellate review be
limited to the cases in which certain "unusual factors" were present. Id. at 294. Such a
case-by-case analysis would allow the courts to engage in unprincipled independent ap-
pellate review as they do now. An issue-by-issue approach would require analysis of
which substantive laws required additional expenditure of appellate resources to ensure
correctness.
For an excellent treatment of the doctrine of independent appellate review, see
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985). Professor
Monaghan argues that "constitutional fact review" is appropriate where it is discretion-
ary rather than mandatory and where "a careful assessment of relevant policy considera-
tions" dictates. Id. at 271. He notes two primary policy considerations: (1) when the
danger of systemic bias of actors in the judicial system exists, and (2) where there is a
need for case-by-case development of the law. Id. However, Professor Monaghan dis-
agrees on the need for independent appellate review of libel actions. "I do not see Bose
as presenting a persuasive case for treating the first amendment differently." Id. at 276.
100 For a proposal that incorporates policy factors in the decision to grant or deny
independent appellate review, see infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
101 Unfettered appellate review is "detrimental to the orderly administration ofjus-
tice, impairs the confidence of litigants and the public in the decisions of the district
courts, and multiplies the number of appeals in such cases." Pendergrass v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1950). For general objections to expanded
appellate review that overrides rule 52(a), see Nangle, The Ever-Widening Scope of Fact
Review in Federal Appellate Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous Rule" Being Avoided, 59 WASH.
U.L.Q. 409 (1981); Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV.
751, 779 (1957); Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of Appellate Fact
Review: Has Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule Been Clearly Erroneous?, 52 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 68 (1977).
Professor Resnik has discerned a general Supreme Court trend to limit opportuni-
ties for review in a variety of areas; Bose is cited as a rare counter-example of this trend.
Resnik, supra note 96, at 604.
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cumstances should qualify a mixed question of law and fact for in-
dependent appellate review.
Professor Calleros has identified several characteristics that
support the application of independent appellate review to a mixed
question of law and fact. 10 2 Professor Calleros would apply in-
dependent appellate review to
finding[s] that requir[e] the refinement or interpretation of a legal
rule in the application of that rule to findings of fact. That charac-
teristic is presented if the historical facts are clear, and if the rule
of law, although "undisputed" in its abstract formulation, is tech-
nical, uncertain, or bound up with sensitive matters of social or
political policy.' 03
Under these criteria the "dearly erroneous" standard of rule 52(a)
would govern the vast majority of mixed questions of law and fact
that do not possess these compelling characteristics. This proposal
would allow appellate courts to target certain substantive issues for
extra judicial resources and would require explicit discussion of the
aforementioned policy considerations, resulting in a predictable and
accountable system of independent appellate review. It would also
end the unseemlyjurisprudence by labels which has undermined the
definitions of law, fact, and mixed law and fact.
The analysis outlined above demonstrates that the Sullivan ac-
tual malice question warrants independent appellate review. The ac-
tual malice test produces a high error rate when applied by triers of
fact'0 4 because of its subjective nature. Actual malice remains an
uncertain standard requiring case-by-case adjudication. 10 5 Appel-
late courts have only begun to delineate its hazy contours and the
inferences that judges may draw from various kinds of evidence. 10 6
The actual malice standard provides crucial protection for constitu-
tional rights and encourages vigorous public discussion of political
and economic issues. 10 7 These factors argue for the application of
independent appellate review to actual malice determinations. The
Bose Court could have reached its desired result by using a princi-
pled analysis rather than by manipulating labels. Had it done so,
102 See Calleros, supra note 77, at 425-32.
103 Id. at 425.
104 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
105 "[rjhis Court's role in marking out the limits of the standard through the pro-
cess of case-by-case adjudication is of special importance." Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1961.
106 The Court has recognized the difficulties inherent in delineating the contours of
a complex rule of law such as the actual malice requirement. "Providing triers of fact
with a general description of the type of communication whose content is unworthy of
protection has not, in and of itself, served sufficiently to narrow the category, nor served
to eliminate the danger that decisions by triers of fact may inhibit the expression of
protected ideas." Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1962 (footnote omitted).
107 See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
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the Court would have established a much-needed and comprehen-
sive doctrine of independent appellate review.
IV
THE FUTURE OF LIBEL LAW AFTER BOSE
Without the use of independent appellate review by federal
courts of appeals and the resulting extraordinary reversal rate of
trial court libel judgments, 108 the current atmosphere conducive to
vigorous debate would not exist.
This exceptionally high reversal rate in libel cases largely re-
sults from two common trial court errors. First, triers of fact often
misapply the actual malice test by reading a "fairness" component
into Sullivan.'0 9 In an attempt to rectify the harm a public figure
plaintiff may sustain from the publication of a false and disparaging
statement, triers of fact frequently ignore the constitutional require-
ment that the defendant possess a culpable mental state. 10 The re-
sulting judgments against publishers who did not intentionally or
recklessly publish the statement contravene Sullivan's basic premise
that the law should proscribe only purposeful defamation of public
figures. "'1
Second, triers of fact violate Sullivan by inferring actual malice
from publishers' failure to adhere to objective standards ofjoumal-
istic conduct.1 2 Appellate courts, however, have steadfastly refused
108 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
110 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
111 The Court has required that erroneous statements must be tolerated to avoid the
chilling of speech. "[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and. . . it must
be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they
'need . .. to survive.'" Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). "[I]n spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liber-
ties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part
of the citizens of a democracy." Id. at 271 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 310 (1940)).
112 Appellate courts have consistently refused to condemn expedient journalistic
practices. See, e.g., Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1259 (5th Cir.
1980) ("mhe fact that Kingsley questioned two people in the office. . . shows that he
made an honest effort to test his belief," even though the results of his "test" did not
confirm his belief.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551
F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.) ("Where a passage is incapable of independent verification, and
where there are no convincing indicia of unreliability, publication of the passage cannot
constitute reckless disregard for truth."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Drotzmanns
v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 500 F.2d 830, 834 (8th Cir. 1974) ("[I]he author . ..was fur-
nished background information by a reliable source. . . . [F]ailure to investigate does
not in itself establish malice."); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 898 (3d
Cir. 1969) (defendant did not act with reckless disregard for plaintiff's rights because he
first checked accuracy of broadcast), afd, 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The D.C. Circuit has
noted the practical limits to the amount of research and verification that can be con-
ducted before an item goes to press. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 972
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to impose any judicially-mandated journalistic standards.113 There-
fore, by requiring proof of actual malice, independent appellate re-
view has bestowed "near-immunity from defamation judgments"1'1 4
upon publishers.
Some commentators have argued, however, that two aspects of
the Sullivan decision undermine the constitutional values that opin-
ion was designed to protect.1 15 First, the subjective nature of the
actual malice test led the Supreme Court, in Herbert v. Lando, 116 to
allow extensive discovery into the editorial processes of publish-
ers. 117 The Court rejected the argument for an absolute privilege
against discovery of a journalist's thoughts, opinions, conclusions,
and editorial conversations concerning an allegedly defamatory
statement. The Court concluded that an absolute prohibition on
the plaintiffs use of such evidence would "constitute a substantial
interference with the ability of a defamation plaintiff to establish the
(D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967). The Fifth Circuit has even held that a
writer may rely on a single nonneutral source. New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d
567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966) ("[A] reporter, without a 'high degree of awareness of their
probable falsity,' may rely on statements made by a single source even though they re-
flect only one side of the story .... "). In another case, the Fifth Circuit refused to
hold a journalist liable when he made a false defamatory statement because his article
included other accurate material. Dacey v. Florida Bar, Inc., 427 F.2d 1292, 1295 (5th
Cir. 1970). The Second Circuit noted in Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d
113, 120-21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977), that both sides of the story at
issue were elicited in good faith. Finally, the First Circuit in Bose acknowledged that
because the writer was writing for a diverse audience and the subject matter was techni-
cal, imprecise language could easily result and should be excused. 692 F.2d 189, 197
(Ist Cir. 1982).
113 For example, courts have steadfastly rejected the contention that inflammatory
statements create a presumption that the publisher was aware of their probable falsity.
See Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 913; Rosenbloom, 415 F.2d at 898; Connor, 365 F.2d at 577; Wash-
ington Post, 365 F.2d at 970 ("the seriousness of a charge, in itself, is not probative of
recklessness"). Even a motive of hostility or vindictiveness on the part of the writer will
not alone support a finding of actual malice. See, e.g., Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914 ("Knowl-
edge of an author's ill-will does not by itself prove knowledge of probable falsity [on the
part of a publisher]."). Precise use of language is not required. Time, Inc. v.Johnston,
448 F.2d 378, 384 (4th Cir. 1971) ("In describing the event, he used phrases of some
vividness, used them in a figurative, not literal, sense, used a form of hyperbole .. ").
114 See Bose, 692 F.2d at 195 (quoting Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. Rav. 1349, 1373
(1975)).
115 Some commentators argue that the current Sullivan rule fails to adequately pro-
tect press freedom when reporting events of public interest and hence call for an abso-
lute press privilege in these areas. See Del Russo, Freedom of the Press and Defamation:
Attacking the Bastion of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 25 ST. Louis U.LJ. 501, 525-33
(1981); Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered" Time to Return to "the Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 CoLuM. L. REv. 603, 620-25 (1983). But see Note,
Summary Judgment in Defamation Actions: A Threat to the Substantive Rights of Public Figure
Plaintiffs, 3 CARDozo L. REv. 105, 128-30 (1981).
116 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
117 Id. at 169-77.
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ingredients of malice as required ... ,"118 Some commentators ar-
gue that publishers will avoid controversial subjects to prevent dis-
covery into sensitive editorial processes, resulting in a chilling of
speech, despite Sullivan."19
Second, some commentators contend that the cost of even a
successful defense against a libel suit is sufficiently high to deter
speech that, although legally protected under Sullivan, might stimu-
late litigation. 120 Some believe that this cost has rendered the pro-
tections of Sullivan null. 12 1
These.two concerns arise from the deleterious effect that cur-
rent civil litigation procedures have on libel actions. Critics of the
extensive discovery allowed into publishers' editorial processes
under Herbert support modification of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure to limit the scope of discovery in libel actions. 122 Critics con-
cerned about the high cost of a successful libel defense support
modifying the doctrine of summary judgment to facilitate early ter-
mination of libel suits. These commentators would raise the burden
of proof the plaintiff must satisfy to allow a libel suit to continue
after the defendant has moved for summary judgment. 123
These proposed remedies derive from the assumptions that Sul-
livan was intended to eliminate all potential chilling effects on
speech concerning public figures and that special rules of civil pro-
cedure are required to protect publishers' first amendment rights.
Although this analysis may have merit, the Supreme Court clearly
did not intend that Sullivan eliminate the public figure libel ac-
118 Id. at 170.
119 See Note, Constitutional Law-Self-Censorship After Herbert v. Lando: The Need for
Special Pre-Trial Procedure in Defamation Action, 58 N.C.L. REV. 1025, 1034-36 (1980).
120 See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 430-36 (1975);
Brill, supra note 43, at 1, 8; Del Russo, supra note 115, at 520; Lewis, supra note 115, at
609, 611-12, 619, 624; Note, Public Figure Defamation: Preserving Summary Judgment to Protect
Free Expression, 49 FORDHAm L. REV. 112, 130-31 (1980).
121 See Anderson, supra note 120, at 437-38; Del Russo, supra note 115, at 525-26;
Lewis, supra note 115, at 624-25.
122 See Note, supra note 119, at 1036-39 (suggests bifurcating discovery into two
phases by allowing investigation into publishers' mental processes only after establish-
ing falsity of statement).
123 For an excellent article on the mechanics of summary judgment, its inappropri-
ateness in libel cases, and a proposal for modification of the existing rules, see Louis,
Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional Defamation Cases, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 707 (1984). See also Lewis, supra note 115, at 619; Note, supra note 120, at
120-32; Comment, The Propriety of Granting Summary Judgment for Defendants in Defamation
Suits Involving Actual Malice, 26 ViLL. L. REV. 470, 479-98 (1981).
In an important case, the Supreme Court shall soon decide whether a plaintiff must
present clear and convincing evidence in order to avoid a successful summaryjudgment
motion for the defendant in public figure libel cases. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson,
746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2672 (1985).
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tion.124 Systemic problems with discovery and summary judgment
are not peculiar to libel actions, and addressing them separately for
each substantive cause of action would be unwise.1 25 To exempt
publishers from the inconvenience and expense of protecting their
rights without providing similar relief for other defendants would be
anomalous.
Creating special rules of civil procedure for libel cases under
Sullivan could almost entirely shield publishers from libel judg-
ments. However, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that provid-
ing publishers absolute immunity against libel suits by public figures
would be "an untenable construction of the First Amendment."' 26
Although the press may continue to seek absolute protection, New
York Times v. Sullivan has greatly benefitted the fourth estate by di-
minishing the chill of self-censorship. Some of the Burger Court's
recent decisions have eroded the outer boundaries of Sullivan. 127
Nonetheless, by affirming the now-common use of independent ap-
pellate review in libel cases, the Burger Court has embraced the
goals of Sullivan's substantive revolution.
Given the current political environment, 28 a third decade of a
124 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). "Civil and criminal liability for defa-
mation was well established in the common law when the First Amendment was
adopted, and there is no indication that the Framers intended to abolish such liability."
Id. at 158. "[Ihe Court has reiterated its conviction ... that the individual's interest in
his reputation is. . .a basic concern." Id. at 169. See also Note, supra note 115, at 128-
29; Note, supra note 119, at 1030-31, 1036.
125 See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176-77.
[M]ushrooming litigation costs, much of it due to pretrial discovery, are
not peculiar to the libel and slander area. There have been repeated ex-
pressions of concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices
from this Court have joined the chorus. But until and unless there are
major changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be
had on what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to
prevent abuse. (footnote omitted).
Id. See also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984), where the Court recently
stated, "We have already declined in other contexts to grant special procedural protec-
tions to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to the constitutional pro-
tections embodied in the substantive laws." (citations omitted).
126 Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176.
127 See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984) (reporters subject to
jurisdiction of foreign state where conduct allegedly calculated to cause injury oc-
curred); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (small but regular
circulation of magazine in foreign state sufficient to subject publisher to jurisdiction in
libel action there); Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169 (there is no press privilege which prevents
normal discovery in libel actions).
128 A crucial battle over the practical effect of Bose is currently being waged in the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
Judge Gasch overturned a jury verdict against the Washington Post and others. Tavou-
lareas v. Washington Post Co., 567 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1983). The D.C. Circuit rein-
stated the verdict against all but one of the defendants, reversing Judge Gasch.
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985), and also denied a motion for rehear-
ing. 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Upon its own motion, the D.C. Circuit, en banc,
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viable and increasingly effective post-Bose Sullivan doctrine may be
the best protection that the press can reasonably expect. As appel-
late courts continue to refine and explicitly identify the contours of
the actual malice standard, trial courts should increasingly find pub-
lishers innocent of libel under Sullivan.129 This development will
discourage questionable libel suits 130 and relieve publishers of the
heavy litigation burdens created when defendants are forced to re-
sort to appellate courts to secure proper application of the Sullivan
rule. 13 1
A recent libel trial which resulted in the acquittal of a publisher
under the actual malice standard illustrates this point. The trial
judge in Sharon v. Time, Inc. 132 was lauded for the care and innova-
tion with which he charged the jury on the actual malice issue.13 3
voted to vacate the panel's decision and to rehear the case en banc. 763 F.2d at 1481. A
decision is imminent.
For other evidence of the controversy over the role of the press, see Abrams & Cain,
Is It Time to Change the Libel Doctrine for Public Figures?, A.B.A. J., July 1985, at 38, 38-41
(Abrams pro-Sullivan, Cain anti-Sullivan); Brill, supra note 43; Safire, Free Speech v. Scalia,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1985, at A17, col. 5. See also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2948 (1985) ("I agree with Justice White that [Sullivan]
should be reexamined .... Consideration of these issues inevitably recalls the apho-
rism ofjournalism. . . 'too much checking on the facts has ruined many a good news
story.' ") (Burger, CJ., concurring).
The Supreme Court has recognized the tendency of triers of fact to under-protect
unpopular speech or speakers. Ajury "is unlikely to be neutral with respect to the con-
tent of speech and holds a real danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression of
those 'vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.'" 104 S. Ct. at
1965 (citing Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971)).
129 As a clear, highly protective libel standard is enunciated by the appellate courts,
trial courts are likely to begin applying the proper legal test. This should result in reach-
ing correct judgments more often, thus obviating the need for a continuation of the
70%o reversal rate.
130 A recent celebrated libel suit, Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., No. 84-7809 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 14, 1985), was withdrawn by the plaintiff after 18 weeks of testimony. The settle-
ment provided only for a placatory statement by the defendant CBS; no monetary com-
pensation was given. Plaintiff Westmoreland spent at least $2 million to bring the suit.
Commentators have speculated that the suit was dropped because of the plaintiff's poor
prospect for success. See Margolick, Risks in Litigation: The Westmoreland and Sharon Cases
Show Cost on Both Sides May Be High, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at B7, col. 1; Press Cau-
tiously Hails Westmoreland's Withdrawal of Libel Suit, N.Y Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at B7, col. 3.
131 In light of the cost and high reversal rate of trial court actual malice determina-
tions, plaintiffs will likely appeal unfavorable decisions only in the most egregious cases.
132 No. 83-4660 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 31, 1985).
133 In Sharon a federal jury found Time magazine did not act with actual malice when
it published a false and defamatory statement about former Israeli Defense Minister
Ariel Sharon. Judge Sofaer took great care in his jury charge to identify the separate
questions and to explain the subtleties of the actual malice standard. The jury consid-
ered each question separately: first, finding that the statement at issue was defamatory,
second, that it was false, but third, that Time did not act with actual malice in publishing
the statement. Judge Sofaer devoted 20 pages of his 66 page charge to an explanation
of actual malice. See McGrath & Stadtman, Absence of Malice, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1985, at
52, 54; The Libel Law at Work, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1985, at 55.
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This charge apparently allowed the jury to appreciate fully the con-
stitutional implications of the actual malice standard and led to an
acquittal. Commentators predict that future libel trials will copy this
procedure. 134 Through such increased precision at the trial level
and through the check on trial courts inherent in independent ap-
pellate review, Sullivan effectively protects the hearty discourse that
characterizes and perpetuates American democracy.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. strongly protects publishers' first amendment in-
terests by affirming the use of independent appellate review by fed-
eral courts of appeals. The decision is especially important in light
of the current political criticism of the organized media. The Court,
however, could have laid a better foundation for its decision by ad-
dressing the distinction between questions of fact and mixed ques-
tions of law and fact that currently determines the application of
independent appellate review. The method proposed in this Note
would enable the judiciary to allocate limited appellate resources in
a principled manner. Adoption of this proposal would allow the use
of independent appellate review in other suitable contexts. The re-
sult would be the successful protection of other important legal
rights in addition to the vital constitutional right to freedom of the
press.
Gary Anthony Paranzino
134 Future libel trials will probably copy the special verdict style of the jury's deliber-
ations required by Judge Sofaer in the Sharon trial to prevent juries from misunderstand-
ing the relevant legal standard to use in reaching their verdict. See The Libel Law at Work,
supra note 133, at 55. One commentator has posited that the withdrawal of the Westmore-
land libel suit after 18 weeks of trial was a "belated reaction" to the prospect that presid-
ingJudge Leval would follow Judge Sofaer in requiring the jury to reach and announce
separate decisions on the issues of truthfulness, defamation, and actual malice. See
Margolick, supra note 130 (summarizing remarks of Professor Blasi).
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